Of Honey and Vinegar: US-Eritrea Integrated Country Strategy

According to the US Department of State, the “four-year strategy that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country” is referred to as the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). It is led by the U.S.A’s Chief of Mission to a country–in the case of Eritrea, the U.S. only has Deputy of Mission Leslie Freriksen since July 2022–and coordinated with “other U.S. Government agencies with programming in the country.”  The ICS was last approved in May 2022; it was “reviewed and updated” in Nov 2023.   A lot happened in Eritrea and the region (Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia)  between May 2022 and Nov 2023.  The following is side-by-side comparison of the two documents.  Strikethroughs indicate text that appeared in the May 2022 ICS but was removed from November 2023.  Green indicates text that was added in 2023. Black font is language that was not revised.

1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Eritrea’s destabilizing military involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia that began in November 2020 destroyed any hope that the 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement would usher in a new era of stability and development in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean forces committed widespread and serious human rights abuses in Tigray. In August 2021, the United States imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on the head of the Eritrean Defense Forces and in November, under Executive Order 14046, sanctioned several Eritrean entities and individuals. Since September 2021, the Embassy has maintained an NSC-endorsed policy of “disciplined confrontation” with the Eritrean government under which it rigorously challenges government mis/disinformation, seeks to isolate Eritrea’s toxic regional influence, and limits its engagement with political-level regime officials. The policy supports the Administration’s goal to defend and advance American values abroad, including by combatting threats to free societies by limiting Eritrea’s anti-democratic and destabilizing influence in the Horn of Africa. Our primary strategic policy goal is to cultivate Eritrea’s next generation and prepare for a post-Isaias era.

Embassy Asmara’s team consists of 12 USDHs, six EFM/EPAP hires, and 237 LE staff, led since 2010 by a Chargé d’Affaires because the Eritrean government will not accept the credentials of an American ambassador. In addition to the Chargé, the current USDH staffing pattern includes a Deputy Chief of Mission, Management Officer, Pol/Econ/Public Affairs Officer, Regional Security Officer, Security Technical Specialist (currently staffed with a one-year TDYer, will be vacant again starting in late 2022), Consular Officer, Information Management Officer, entry- level Information Management Specialist, Office Management Specialist, an EFM RSO Office Management Assistant (currently vacant), a part-time EFM Community Liaison Officer, an EFM General Services Assistant, and an EPAP Assistant PAO. In 2022, we expect to add PAO and GSO positions. This ICS aligns the Embassy’s ends with its modest means, i.e., our mission goals and objectives are realistic for a small post with a limited budget operating in one of Africa’s most repressive and impoverished dictatorships, which is also hostile to the United States.

Embassy Asmara’s #1 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our ACS “customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during arrests, deaths, child abductions, destitution, and criminal victimization. The Consular Section also supports several retired dual nationals living in Asmara. The Embassy is revitalizing its American Liaison network, refreshing its list of American citizens, and bringing online a new emergency contact system. Through careful screening of visa applicants, information sharing with the Eritrean government, and (at the moment, limited) law enforcement cooperation, the Embassy seeks to prevent potential malefactors from travelling to the United States.
Monitor and Report on Developments in Eritrea. Embassy Asmara’s diplomatic reporting is the only reliable U.S. source of information and context on Eritrea for U.S. policymakers. Eritrea has no independent media and Voice of America is the only international media in country, which is represented by a (presumably regime-approved) Eritrean national. The regime also tightly controls information that most other countries would make publicly available.
Promote fundamental human rights, democracy, and American values: Eritrea has one of Africa’s worst human rights records. The regime of President Isaias Afwerki is repressive and totalitarian. Dissent and civil society are not permitted. A liberal constitution was drafted but never adopted. There is no freedom of speech or assembly, and religious freedom is limited. Citizens are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention. Eritrea is ranked as Tier 3 for Trafficking in Persons due to its mandatory, indefinite National Service program, which is in essence forced labor, and is designated as a Country of Particular Concern for international religious freedom. In 2021, the European Union imposed human rights-related sanctions on Eritrea. Our carefully calibrated approach to advancing human rights uses diplomatic engagement; exchange programs; our Embassy Facebook page and other public diplomacy programming; American Center activities; visits by U.S. officials; and collaboration with local like-minded diplomatic missions.

Support regional peace and security: Eritrea’s foreign policies are inimical to and actively seek to thwart U.S. interests. In a coordinated effort to reduce Eritrea’s ability to engage in destabilizing regional activities and end its involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, the Embassy works closely with Washington to encourage regional partners, EU members, and others to limit high-level engagement with and support of President Isais’ regime and to curtail the ruling PFDJ party’s diaspora fundraising.

Counter malign Chinese influence: China maintains a large embassy in Asmara and has a very active public outreach program. In late November 2021, Eritrea signed, in response to U.S. sanctions, a Memorandum of Understanding with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative and hosted Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yi in January 2022. China gets favorable treatment by and placement in Eritrea’s state-run media (there is no independent local media). However, China’s shoddy business practices and suspicions of its intentions provide an opening for us to counter Chinese narratives and highlight the dangers of Chinese investment to Eritrea’s economy.

The November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement brought an end to a two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia and precipitated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the Tigray region.

The peace process and Eritrea’s de-escalation of military presence provides an opportunity to reshape bilateral relations with Eritrea to a more productive end, including peace and development in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Embassy in Asmara, Eritrea, strives to build on this positive change and increase the understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Eritrea. Eritrea’s return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also presents an opportunity to encourage positive and constructive relations between Eritrea, its neighbors, and regional organizations, and to promote resolution of Horn of Africa matters with a focus on sustainable regionally led solutions.

The Embassy’s ability to capitalize on such initiatives to promote democracy and good government, however, is constrained by the absence of the usual foreign assistance and constructive policy tools. In 2005, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) ordered USAID, other bilateral donors, and international NGOs to depart the country. In 2022, the GSE ordered the Embassy to close the American Center indefinitely, restricting the Embassy’s ability to engage with the citizens of Eritrea. Further, the U.S. government implemented sanctions against Eritrean individuals and entities for their involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia, in addition to human rights abuses committed by Eritrean troops. An atrocities determination also was issued against all parties in the conflict, including Eritrea’s military.

Eritrea’s tier 3 rating for Trafficking in Persons, and designation as a Country of Particular Concern with regard to religious freedom, further impede use of funds for targeted programs.

While sanctions remain in place, the embassy will endeavor to open communication lines to establish commonalities that serve the interests of the people of both countries. To accomplish these goals, the embassy will share information on American values and interests, seek opportunities to increase cultural and professional exchange programs between Americans and Eritreans, listen to Eritrean perspectives on regional and international issues, and promote the positive inclusion of Eritreans in regional initiatives.

1.Support regional peace and security: Eritrea’s pursuit for complete self-reliance is an admirable and ambitious policy, but it comes at a steep cost: isolation. However, Eritrea, in 2023 initiated outreach to regional leadership, and rejoined IGAD, which welcomed Eritrea’s renewed interest. In late 2022, Eritrea signed a five-year Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework with the United Nations. The President of Kenya visited in December 2022, the first trip by a Kenyan President in four years, for discussions on regional peace and stability, economic integration, and establishing a diplomatic presence by opening embassies. The GSE called for peace in Sudan and hosted both factions separately in an effort to establish a dialogue and promote peace.

As a priority, the Embassy will continue to encourage Eritrea to become a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including continued pursuit of improved relations with neighboring countries, and within the region.

2. Promote fundamental human rights, economic development, and democracy: The Eritrean leadership, in place since the nation won a 30-year independence struggle from Ethiopia in 1991, implemented, in the name of national security, a range of policies that have curtailed basic human rights, stifled economic growth and, until recently, isolated Eritrea from its neighbors and beyond.

Yet, in his annual speech in March 2023, the President highlighted new policies to promote economic development, including the mining sector, renewable energy, water conservation, and agriculture. The GSE recently partnered with the Africa Development Bank to develop a solar energy plant to reduce the number of near constant electricity outages, which plague Eritrea daily. Interest in water conservation and expanded agriculture production is driving numerous agriculture and dam construction projects, some initiated with multilateral support. The GSE also has focused particular attention to improve the health conditions of Eritrean citizens, running vaccine campaigns for childhood diseases and HPV, as well as making a concerted effort to eliminate female genital mutilation.

These programs for fostering sustainable economic development and improving health conditions are in concert with common U.S. policy interests and offer an opportunity to open bilateral partnership and enhance our mutual understanding.

Further, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) owns major commercial investments including interest in all of Eritrea’s mines. Eritrea and the PRC conduct multiple cultural and technical exchanges from medical expertise to agriculture projects. However, as highlighted by President Isaias, Eritrea has many areas of economic investment, environmental concerns, and technical exchanges in which the United States, committed to upholding the highest international standards for business practices and rule of law, brings a better competitive position compared to PRC investments and activities.

3.Sharing American values and fostering relations with Eritreans: Our diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focused on laying the groundwork for better relations in post-Isaias era by building ties with the Eritrean people. The president is in his late seventies.  He will not rule forever.  Our public diplomacy programs, including the American Center, which attracts drew 100-250 daily visitors per day , are designed to cultivate promote cultural exchange and engender close relations with students, educators, artists, intellectuals, businesspeople, religious leaders, technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civil society contacts. We also coordinate closely with local diplomatic counterparts who share our values and vision for a more democratic Eritrea.  These programs provide an avenue for sharing cultural values, language, educational curricula, and invitational travel, while fostering closer connections to the people of Eritrea. The GSE closed the American Center for an unspecified period of time in November 2022. A top priority is engagement with the GSE to reopen the center in part or whole to continue a key aspect of diplomacy: people-to-people relations building. This is an aspect well-understood and utilized by the GSE through its many cultural festivals, community centers, and public affairs activities within the United States and throughout other regions of the world.

4.Protect and assist U.S. citizens. Most of our American Citizens Services (ACS)“customers” are Eritrean-Americans. We provide routine consular services and emergency assistance during arrests, deaths, child abductions, destitution, and criminal victimization, when a consular officer is assigned to and present at the Embassy. The Embassy curtailed most services since September 2022, due to a lack of an assigned consular officer. The Embassy also faces persistent barriers by the GSE in accessing arrested and detained American-Eritrean citizens. The Consular Section supports several retired dual nationals living in Asmara. The Embassy is revitalizing its American Liaison network, refreshing its list of American citizens, and bringing a new emergency contact system online.

Management Priorities

Upgrade our facilities: Embassy Asmara’s physical plant is an eight-building, 3.2-acre compound built nearly 100 years ago on which no significant renovations or updates were done during the 2003-2016 period. In 2019 OBO approved a $12 $19 million critical upgrades and renovation project. The first phase was completed in December 2021. The second – and largest – phase began in January 2022. It will last at least two three years and involve dozens of contractors, but once completed will enhance the mission’s operational efficiency.

Create and fill a new ARSO position: Based on our current staffing trajectory, by summer 2022, we will have 14 USDH and as many as 8-10 EFMs, bringing the total U.S. footprint to 22-24 people, doubling the number under COM authority. In addition, as Post becomes more attractive to families, we expect this number to continue to increase. Our sole RSO is unsustainably stretched as he seeks to balance his responsibilities as Post’s security advisor, crisis responder, and safe guarder of Mission personnel, information, and property, and the manager of nearly 200 local staff. The November 2020 rocket attacks in Asmara marked a change in the regional security environment forcing the COM to reconsider how Post maintains its security posture. On multiple occasions, the sole RSO faced challenges in efforts to request trained DS TDY support to allow for necessary rest and recuperation (R&R). TDY requests for relief were often hampered by the unavailability of DS trained security agents for the needed time and/or manpower constraints of nearby Posts in the region. Post considers the risk of leaving an identified Post Security Officer (PSO) that lacks specialized DS training that all agents undergo as unsustainable coupled with the increase in operational footprint. An ARSO position would decrease the number of demands placed on the RSO and allow him/her to enhance overall leadership to the section, provide strategic guidance to the Chief of Mission and other regional inter-agency partners, and focus on the Mission priority of strengthening relations with national actors to improve information coordination, in support of the Administration’s top goal of protecting the United States.

Create and fill an HRO position: Together with the approved GSO position, the addition of an HRO would bring Embassy Asmara’s Management team in line with M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing recommendation. Three factors drive this request: (1) The Embassy has a disproportionately high number of local staff to USDH because the 160-plus person local guards are employed by the Embassy. Given normal turn-over and a robust Special Immigrant Visa program, this perpetually creates a relatively large pool of vacant positions. As a result, the HR team must devote a large percentage of its time to recruitment. (2) High local demand for U.S. Embassy jobs results in the HR team receiving dozens to hundreds of applications for most, especially unskilled, positions. (3) The Embassy is not able to use automated systems to screen and manage applications because no one has Internet (Internet penetration is less than 2%). As a result, manual screening is required for all applicants. An HRO would provide better oversight of the team and relieve the Management Officer of this responsibility.

2.    Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Support regional peace and security.

• Mission Objective 1: Encourage Eritrea to be a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including support of global initiatives with commonalities between Eritrea and U.S. policy.
• Mission Objective 2: Promote the Eritrean government’s positive support of regionally led peace and security initiatives.

Mission Goal 2: Promote economic development, fundamental human rights, and democracy.

• Mission Objective 2.1: Promote inclusive economic growth and regional economic integration through improved diplomatic engagement and prioritization of sustainable development, energy, agriculture, health and other economic fields of mutual concern.
• Mission Objective 2.2  National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).
• Mission Objective 2.3: Embassy works with the GSE to expand Eritrea’s civic space to allow the establishment of local independent civil society and elevate the voices of Eritreans.

Mission Goal 3: Foster strong relations with the Eritrean people and share American culture and values.

• Mission Objective 3.1: Embassy reaches an agreement with the Government of Eritrea to reopen the American Center to expand cultural and educational exchanges and engender closer relations with Eritreans across the entire
• Mission Objective 3.2: Embassy and the GSE collaborate on increasing awareness, among U.S. and Eritrean people, of shared interests in public health, climate adaptation, environmental conservation, and women and youth empowerment.

Mission Goal 4: U.S. citizens in Eritrea and the United States are safe.

• Mission Objective 4.1: Expand the access of citizens in Eritrea to Embassy services by upgrading Embassy’s suite of communications/outreach tools and increasing frequency of outreach.
• Mission Objective 4.2: Enhanced cooperation between the Embassy and the Government of Eritrea at the “technical” level prevents potential malefactors from traveling to the United States and improves to improve access to and release of detained American Citizens.

Mission Goal 2: The Eritrean government improves its performance on human rights.

• Mission Objective 2.1: There are tangible improvements in religious freedom such as official recognition of additional religious denominations beyond the four the government currently recognizes.
• Mission Objective 2.2: National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).
• Mission Objective 2.3: A limited number of independent proto-civil society groups are established.
• Mission Objective 2.4: Effect the release of or at least determine status of LE staff and Ciham Abdu AliLE Staff.

Mission Goal 3: Support regional peace and security.

• Mission Objective 3.1: Limit Eritrea’s ability to undermine stability in the Horn of Africa.
• Mission Objective 3.2: Eritrea does not object to or seek to block U.S. global initiatives such as a negotiated end to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, countering Russian aggression in Europe, and resisting Chinese efforts to dominate the UN.

Mission Goal 4: Restored U.S. credibility and reasserted global leadership position the United States as a strong partner for the Eritrean people.

• Mission Objective 4.1: Embassy identifies and cultivates future leaders and opinion makers.
• Mission Objective 4.2: Rooted in our commitment to democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the United States prevails in our strategic competition with China for the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Eritreans.

Management Objective 1: Embassy’s physical plant is able to support mission activities and personnel.

Management Objective 2: Embassy is properly staffed to achieve its goals.

3.    Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1: Support regional peace and security.

Description: Eritrea’s withdrawal of military forces from northern Ethiopia in response to the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Eritrean  efforts to facilitate peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan, and Eritrea’s more transparent, proactive and positive foreign policy outreach to regional countries and organizations, provide an opening for the Embassy to encourage and support Eritrea to become a more constructive member of the international community.

Objective 1.1: Encourage Eritrea to be a proactive and constructive member of the international community, including support of global initiatives with commonalities between Eritrea and U.S. policy.

• Justification: Eritrea’s military involvement in Ethiopia threatened to destabilize the region and triggered financial sanctions designed to limit Eritrea’s ability to prosecute the conflict. Eritrea has withdrawn the majority of its military from Ethiopia, and it is poised to re-engage regionally to achieve economic integration and settlement of regional conflicts.
• Linkages: JRS 1: Strengthening the capacity of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. JRS 1.3: Address the immediate causes of conflict through long-term investments and institution-building in the security sector.
• Risks: If Eritrea fails to act constructively in the region, prioritizing its policy of self- reliance above peaceful resolution of local conflicts and regional integration, destabilization of the Horn of Africa could increase.

Objective 1.2: Promote the Eritrean government’s positive support of regionally-led peace and security initiatives.

• Justification: Eritrea historically has followed a policy of self-reliance, leading to its isolation. Eritrea recently has taken steps to play a more proactive and transparent role in regionally-led initiatives, including towards resolving the conflict in Sudan.
• Linkages: JRS 1: Strengthen the capability of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict.
• Risks: Eritrea actively campaigns against U.S. and international efforts to quell rising tensions and instability in the region.

Mission Goal 2: Promote economic development, fundamental human rights, and democracy.

Description: Eritrea, under the justification of defending its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, has eliminated all civic space and the free exercise of most fundamental human rights. Our goal is to demonstrate advancing civic space and human rights will not undermine Eritrea’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) pledges a shared vision “that the foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected” while also reinforcing “universal human rights must be upheld.” Eritrea’s lack of civic space and fundamental freedom continues to be a major impediment to improving bilateral relations and has curtailed pursuit of the United States’ National Security Strategy goal to “Build 21^st Century U.S.-Africa Partnerships.”

Objective 2.1: Promote inclusive economic growth and regional economic integration through improved diplomatic engagement and prioritization of sustainable development, energy, agriculture, health and other economic fields of mutual concern.

• Justification: Eritrea’s economy is largely stagnant, and basic services are limited, due to factors such as minimal exports and highly controlled imports, lack of economic diversification, currency control, environmental considerations including unreliable rain and water sourcing, long-term national service across the population, sanctions, and continuing migration of the educated class. Eritrea is taking steps to incorporate renewable energy and sustainable agricultural practices into its economic strategy, along with tackling other shared challenges such as communicable diseases and climate change. To date, the majority of Eritrea’s economic engagement has focused on bilateral engagement with the PRC, Russia, and India.
• Linkages: JRS 2: Increase mutually beneficial economic growth, trade and investment.  JRS 2.3: Improve economic governance and regional integration for trade and investment. JRS 42: Accelerate equitable, inclusive, and accessible actions to address climate crisis, build the capacity to adapt, and foster resilience to climate-related environment changes.
• Risks: Eritrea maintains its current protectionist trade policies and does not institute governance reforms to support economic transparency, growth, and integration. Eritrea does not constructively address these shared challenges within the rules-based international system.

Objective 2.2: National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).

• Justification: Eritrea’s current National Service system involves indefinite conscription for both military and civilian jobs, including some that are purely economic in character. As National Service workers have no ability to leave or refuse a job, it is a form of forced labor according to international standards. As this is a governmental policy, Eritrea is annually ranked as TIP Tier 3 country, and thus subject to TIP-related sanctions. This prevents us from using our development agencies and financing tools to provide assistance to promote stability, as envisioned in the NSS, and from increasing mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment as outlined in the JRS. In addition, the policy also causes many young Eritreans to flee the country, exposing them to arbitrary detention, deportation, or exploitation and abuse, and further undermining Eritrea’s development potential.
• Linkages: JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. NSS: To realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.
• Risks: Without National Service reform, Eritreans will continue fleeing the country, impeding Eritrea’s economic development, exacerbating the refugee situations in nearby countries and Europe, exposing Eritreans to human trafficking networks, and severely restricting the provision of U.S. assistance.

Objective 2.3: Embassy works with the GSE to expand Eritrea’s civic space to allow the establishment of local independent civil society and elevate the voices of Eritreans.

• Justification: This objective supports the United States’ intention to “revitalize democracy the world over.” Independent “civil society” groups are not allowed in Eritrea. All such organizations are controlled directly by the government or the ruling party, leaving ordinary Eritreans with few independent outlets for organizing and helping each other.
• Linkages: JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. NSS: To realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.
• Risks: A lack of a civil society impedes Eritrea’s development and leaves its people vulnerable to any shocks that render the government unable or unwilling to assist its

Mission Goal 3: Foster strong relations with the Eritrean people and share American culture and values.

Description: With a large Eritrean diaspora, the United States is already the partner of choice for many Eritreans, in country and abroad. Through demonstrated leadership in the areas of mutual interests, such as economic opportunity, we will strengthen the United States’ standing among Eritreans. This is intended to lay the foundation for improved relations with the Eritrean population, both current and future.

Objective 3.1: Embassy reaches an agreement with the Government of Eritrea to reopen the American Center to expand cultural and educational exchanges and engender closer relations with Eritreans across the entire society.

• Justification: The American Center represents the Embassy’s most effective public diplomacy tool for expanding people-to-people relations with The American Center historically hosted a range of classes, such as English language courses, robotics for youth, art classes, as well as an internet café offering Eritreans the ability to take virtual courses helping to bolster their higher education in areas of interest, such as technology or sciences. The Center’s movie nights and book club provided an opportunity for Americans and Eritreans to exchange cultural perspectives.
• Linkages: JRS 2: Expand African capacity and technological innovation to foster effective participation in global markets. JRS: 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, and environmental change.
• Risks: The Government of Eritrea continues to misinterpret the role of the American Center, not as a venue for building partnership and expanding Eritrean knowledge about the United States, but a tool to undermine the Eritrean government’s policies, thereby reducing the ability of Americans and Eritreans to build cultural bonds.

Objective 3.2: Embassy and the GSE collaborate on increasing awareness, among U.S. and Eritrean people, of shared interests in public health, climate adaptation, environmental conservation, and women and youth empowerment.

• Justification: The Government of Eritrea promotes several programs related to health, climate and environment, and women and youth empowerment. For example, the government touts a whole-of-country vaccine program for children, and recently launched HPV vaccines for girls. Other nationwide programs include a dedicated effort to eliminate female genital mutilation and gender-based violence, as well as support for the National Union of Eritrean Women. Renewable energy topped the President’s economic These programs, mutually championed by the United States, provide an avenue for collaborative efforts as partners.
• Linkages: JRS 2.2: Expand African capacity and technological innovation to foster effective participation in global JRS: 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, and environmental change. NSS: To engage African countries as equal partners to achieve our shared priorities from health and pandemic preparedness to climate change.
• Risks: The Government of Eritrea often shuns international support of its internal programs. It may refuse to engage in bilateral partnerships or to support international organizations addressing global challenges.

Mission Goal 4: U.S. citizens in Eritrea and the United States are safe.

Description: Consistent with the Interim National Security Strategy Guideline’ (INSSG) “solemn obligation NSS goal “to protect the security of the American people,” Embassy Asmara’s #1 #4 priority is to protect and assist U.S. citizens. This is complicated by several factors, including no consular commissioned officer assigned to the Embassy, limited communications options in country, lack of internet for ordinary travelers and residents, and the fact that the Eritrean government does not recognize dual-nationals’ U.S. citizenship.

Objective 4.1: Expand the access of U.S. citizens in Eritrea to Embassy services by upgrading Embassy’s suite of communications/outreach tools and increasing frequency of outreach.

• Justification: Normal methods of consular communication, g., MASCOT, email, and the Embassy Facebook page, do not work well in Eritrea due to lack of internet access. The Embassy needs to identify other ways to communicate with local U.S. citizens.
• Linkages: JRS Goal 1.2: Improve the capacity and will of security forces, including defense and civilian sector actors, to identify and respond to ongoing transnational threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, maritime security, and border insecurity. INSSG NSS: To protect the security of the American people.
• Risks: Our ability to understand the number and locations of U.S. citizens and to assist U.S. citizens in crises will be diminished if we don’t without an effective means of routine and emergency communication.

Objective 4.2: Enhanced cooperation between the Embassy and the Government of Eritrea at the technical level prevents potential malefactors from traveling to the United States and improves to improve access to and release of detained American Citizens and LE Staff.

• Justification | Preventing potential malefactors from traveling to the United States supports the INSSG goal of protecting the American people but is not something we can do on our own. Consistent with the U.S. pledge to again “embrace international cooperation,” our efforts require the assistance of international partners such as Interpol and the UN as well as the Eritrean government, especially with regard to ensuring the integrity of documents, exchange of crime information, and border controls.
• Linkages | JRS Goal 1.2: Improve the capacity and will of security forces, including defense and civilian sector actors, to identify and respond to ongoing transnational threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, maritime security, and border insecurity. INSSG: To protect the security of the American people.
• Risks | Deterioration of bilateral relationship and tougher human rights-related sanctions, which could result if the Eritrean Defense Forces are further implicated in the atrocities committed in Tigray, Ethiopia, that prohibit all but humanitarian U.S. assistance to Eritrea could further degrade – or even eliminate – cooperation. Failing to achieve this objective leaves the United States more vulnerable to terrorists and others who seek to harm it and its people.

Mission Goal 2 | The Eritrean government improves its performance on human rights.

Description | Eritrea’s abysmal human rights record runs counter to the INSSG pledge to “defend and protect human rights and address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization in all its forms” and continues to be the greatest impediment to improving bilateral relations. Eritrea is a Country of Particular Concern for religious freedom and Tier 3 for Trafficking in Persons, both of which carry sanctions and restrict programmatic options to support the government of Eritrea. Moreover, these human rights abuses, while intended to promote stability, cause state fragility in the long term. Supporting Eritrea to improve its human rights record is consistent with the United States’ goal to “continue to build partnerships in Africa.”

Objective 2.1 | There are tangible improvements in religious freedom such as official recognition of additional religious denominations beyond the four the government currently recognizes.

• Justification | Until Eritrea is no longer a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), the United States is limited due to CPC-related sanctions in how it can engage with and support Eritrea. This is consistent with the United States recommitment to core civil rights and liberties and the Africa Bureau Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) goal of upholding universal values and promoting human dignity.
• Linkages | JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life and recommitting to core civil rights and liberties.
• Risks | Not achieving progress on this goal will impede Eritrea’s development,

compel more Eritreans to flee Eritrea, further depleting its diversity and human capital, and prevent improvements to the bilateral relationship.

Objective 2.2 | National Service program returns to 18-months (from the current interpretation as indefinite service).

• Justification | Eritrea’s current National Service system involves indefinite conscription for both military and civilian jobs, including some that are purely economic in character. As National Service workers have no ability to leave or refuse a job, it is a form of forced labor according to international standards. As this is a governmental policy, Eritrea is a TIP Tier 3 country every year, and thus subject to TIP-related sanctions. This prevents us from using our development agencies and financing tools to provide assistance to promote stability, as envisioned in the INSSG, and from increasing mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment as outlined in the JRS. In addition, the policy also causes many young Eritreans to flee the country, undermining Eritrea’s development potential and leading to further instability in the region.
• Linkages | JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.
• Risks | Without National Service reform, Eritreans will continue fleeing the country, impeding Eritrea’s development, exacerbating the refugee situations in nearby countries and Europe, exposing Eritreans to human trafficking networks, and severely restricting the provision of U.S. assistance.

Objective 2.3| A limited number of independent proto-civil society groups are established.

• Justification | This objective supports the United States’ intention to “revitalize democracy the world over,” working with likeminded allies and partners. Independent “civil society” groups are not allowed in Eritrea. All such organizations are controlled directly by the government or the ruling party, leaving ordinary Eritreans with few independent outlets for organizing and helping each other.
• Linkages | JRS 3: Strengthen democracy, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity to build strong, accountable, and democratic institutions, sustained by a deep commitment to human rights and to generate greater peace and prosperity. INSSG: Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.
• Risks | A lack of a civil society impedes Eritrea’s development and leaves its people vulnerable to any shocks that render the government unable or unwilling to assist its people.

Objective 2.4 | Effect the release of or at least determine status of imprisoned LE staff and Ciham Abdu Ali.

• Justification The continued unjust detentions of our LE staff and U.S. citizen Ciham Abdu Ali citizens, including those who have been designated as wrongful detentions, are an anathema to the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights, undermine our national security priority to protect the security of the American people, and are major impediments pose an impediment to full rapprochement between our governments.  The LE staff were detained due to their political and religious beliefs.  Ms Abdu Ali was detained at the age of 15 for her father’s political beliefs. 
• Linkages: Linkages | JRS 1.1: Strengthening the capacity of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media. INSSG: Realizing NSS: To realize and defending defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.
• Risks: Failure to determine the status of or secure the release of these individuals, especially Ciham Abdu Ali,  will continue to cause friction in the bilateral relationship and increase risk of attracting negative attention from U.S. Congress.

Mission Goal 3 | Support regional peace and security.

Description | Eritrea’s foreign policies are inimical to and actively seek to thwart U.S. interests, including the INSSG-stated goal to bring an end to the African continent’s deadliest conflicts and prevent the onset of new ones. The Embassy is advancing a broader policy of regime isolation and financial sanctions to limit its ability to perpetuate the conflict in northern Ethiopia. We are working closely with Washington to encourage regional partners, EU members, and others to limit or cease engagement with and support of President Isais’ regime and to closely monitor the impact of – and regime response to – E.O. 14046 sanctions.

Objective 3.1 | Limit Eritrea’s ability to undermine stability in the Horn of Africa.

• Justification | Following the signing of the 2018 peace agreement with Ethiopia, the United States and international community were optimistic that Eritrea was breaking with its past, destabilizing behavior and sought to play constructive role in achieving regional integration and the settlement of regional conflicts. This optimism has not borne out. Eritrea’s military involvement in Ethiopia threatens to destabilize the region and has triggered financial sanctions designed to limit Eritrea’s ability to prosecute the conflict and a diplomatic effort to isolate President Isais and the regime.
• Linkages | JRS 1.1: Strengthening the capacity of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. JRS 1.3: Address the immediate causes of conflict through long-term investments and institution-building in the security sector. INSSG: Protecting the security of the American people.
• Risks | If Eritrea does not remove its forces from Tigray and begin acting constructively in the region, local conflicts could increase dramatically and destabilize the region. Already, the presence and behavior of Eritrean troops are the biggest recruiting tool for the rebel forces in Tigray.

Objective 3.2 | Eritrea does not object to or seek to block U.S. global initiatives such as a negotiated end to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, countering Russian aggression in Europe, and resisting Chinese efforts to dominate the UN.

• Justification | Currently, Eritrea votes against the United States on most contested United Nations votes.
• Linkages | JRS 1.1: Strengthen the capability of multilateral and regional organizations, government institutions, and civil society to prevent worsening state fragility and the emergence of armed conflict. JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations, by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media.
• Risks | Eritrea actively campaigns against U.S. candidates and encourages fringe nations to do the same.

Mission Goal 4 | Restored U.S. credibility and reasserted global leadership position the United States as a strong partner for the Eritrean people.

Description | Due to the large Eritrean diaspora and several successful members of the diaspora, the United States is already the partner of choice for many Eritreans. Through demonstrated leadership in the areas of democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity, we will build on this and make the United States the preferred choice for the majority. This is intended to lay the bedrock for better relations in the future when Eritrea’s current aging leadership, for whom the most formative experience was the independence struggle, exit their positions.

Objective 4.1 | Embassy identifies and cultivates future leaders and opinion makers.

• Justification | Current senior Eritrean leaders publicly support the regime narrative that the United States is an enemy that did not support the independence struggle, but the upcoming generations are far more reasonable. In order to have influence in the future direction of the country, we need to actively cultivate this younger generation. China is currently doing the same.
• Linkages | JRS 3.2: Promote and protect fundamental human rights for all people, including marginalized populations, by improving equality and inclusion to advance human rights, bolster civil society capacity, and support independent and professional media. JRS 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, an environmental change. INSSG: Reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world.
• Risks | China is actively involved in cultivating the same future leaders, and offers more (in terms of scholarships, fellowships, etc.) than we are able to offer. Therefore, if we do not successfully compete in this arena, we are likely to lose the new generations to Chinese influence.

Objective 4.2 | Rooted in our commitment to democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the United States prevails in our strategic competition with China for the “hearts and minds” of ordinary Eritreans.

Justification | The government of Eritrea is ideologically drawn to China’s governing philosophy, while the people prefer that of the United States. During Eritrea’s years of isolation, China was the only major power willing to support it. Eritrea moving further into China’s sphere of influence (Eritrea signed a Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding with China in November 2021) would greatly reduce our ability to influence the region as a whole.

Linkages | JRS 4.4: Build the skills of Africa’s current and next generation to adapt to longer-term economic, social, and environmental changes.

Risks | An Eritrea strategically aligned with China will see no reason to reform its human rights issues and could deny the United States access to a large part of the mostvaluable shipping route in the world and increases China’s foothold in the Horn of Africa.

4.    Management Objective

Management Objective 1: Embassy’s physical plant is able to support mission activities and personnel.

• Justification: Embassy Asmara is housed in an eight-building, 3.2-acre compound with buildings that are nearly over 100 years old. No significant renovations or updates were done during the 2003-2016 period of poor bilateral relations because due to the Eritrean government would not Government’s refusal to issue visas to any official Americans other than the for required construction maintenance staff. Visas were typically limited to the Embassy’s core diplomatic personnel. For nearly two decades, our Management Officers and LE staff have worked heroically to maintain the buildings and meet relevant U.S. health and safety standards with limited resources locally available. This is an immense challenge and since certain projects simply can’t cannot be done with local resources. In 2019, OBO approved a $12 million critical upgrades and renovations project $19 million critical renovation and upgrades project. The first phase was completed in December 2021. The second – and largest – phase began in March 2023 and is expected to run for multiple years. In summer 2021, significant repairs were made to roofing infrastructure; however, some roofs will require complete replacement to provide long-term building stability. 
• Linkages: AF-AFR JRS Bureau Cross-Cutting Management Objective: Revitalize the diplomatic and development workforce and infrastructure in a diverse, inclusive, equitable, and accessible manner.
• Risks: Without significant renovation and repair, Embassy Asmara will not be able to support mission personnel and activities, and safety standards will not be met.

Management Objective 2 | Embassy is properly staffed to achieve its goals.

• Justification | The PAO and GSO positions requested in previous MRRs have been approved and Post will work with Washington to staff these positions in 2022. M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing Review for Embassy Asmara concluded that the Embassy’s customer- to-management ratio is nearly triple that of its comparators; M/PRI’s model projects three USDH positions. Currently, Embassy Asmara has only one Management Officer who oversees the GSO, FMO, HRO, and Facilities Maintenance functions. In addition, we are in the early stages of a two-year, $12 million OBO project to renovate our long- neglected and much-in-need-of-repairs Embassy compound. While the addition of the GSO position will relieve the Management Officer of GSO-related responsibilities, we assess that, without the addition of another USDH to the Management team, the MO will continue to be overwhelmed and Embassy operations negatively affected. Based on our current staffing trajectory, by year-end 2022, the total US footprint could as high as 30 people (USDH, EFMs, PSCs, long-term TDY), tripling the number under COM authority. As Post becomes more attractive to families, we expect this number to continue to increase. As such, Embassy Asmara requests the following positions:

o            ARSO (first requested in 2021 ICS/MRR): Our sole RSO is unsustainably stretched as he seeks to balance his responsibilities as Post’s security advisor, crisis responder, and safe guarder of Mission personnel, information, and property, and the manager of nearly 200 local staff. An Assistant RSO position would decrease the number of demands placed on the RSO and allow him/her to enhance overall leadership to the section, provide strategic guidance to the Chief of Mission and other regional inter-agency partners, and focus on the Mission priority of strengthening relations with national actors to improve information coordination, in support of the Administration’s top goal of protecting the United States.

o            HRO (first time request): Together with the approved GSO position, the addition of an HRO would bring Embassy Asmara’s Management team in line with M/PRI’s 2017 Rightsizing recommendation. Three factors drive this request: (1)

The Embassy has a disproportionately high number of local staff to USDH because the 160-plus person local guards are employed by the Embassy. Given normal turn-over and a robust Special Immigrant Visa program, this perpetually creates a relatively large pool of vacant positions. As a result, the HR team must devote a large percentage of its time to recruitment. (2) High local demand for

U.S. Embassy jobs results in the HR team receiving dozens to hundreds of applications for most, especially unskilled, positions. (3) The Embassy is not able to use automated systems to screen and manage applications because no one has Internet (Internet penetration is less than 2%). As a result, manual screening is required for all applicants. An HRO would provide better oversight of the team and relieve the Management Officer of this responsibility.

Source:

May 2022 ICS

Nov 2023 ICS